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Fighting new intergenerational and skill inequalities will also sustain new, knowledge 
intensive growth 
 
As the OECD points out, the risk of poverty for older people has fallen, while poverty of 
young adults and families with children has risen. Those worst hit are children (born in work-
poor families), unskilled young people, especially women, single mothers and migrants. 
Moreover, during the crisis, the elderly, the pensioners are faring much better than the young. 
Yet, despite these changes in the distribution of poverty and life chances, the redistributive 
structure of our welfare states has not changed. Worse, it has increasingly concentrated its 
expenditure on the elderly. At the heart of the problem lies the fact that public spending on 
healthcare and pensions, which primarily benefit the elderly, is disproportionately higher than 
spending on childcare, education and training, which by nature are geared more towards 
younger generations. 
 
 
Figure 1: Ratio of per capita spending on the elderly to per capita spending on the non-
elderly 
 
  
 
SOURCE: Julia Lynch, Age in the Welfare State. 
 
While public expenditure on pensions has increased from 6.6% of GDP to 8.3% on average 
between 1980 and 2007 in the 21 richest OECD countries, public expenditure on education 
has gone from 5.6% to 4.8% during the same period, while spending on vocational training 
has diminished almost everywhere (even in Nordic countries) over the recent period. 
 
This of course reflects demographic changes in our societies, characterised by the fact that 
people are living longer (hence benefiting from longer pension periods), more people are 
retiring (the baby boom has turned into a papy boom, and the papy boomers have been lucky 
enough to have lived and worked during a period of exceptional growth with almost no 
unemployment, thus having a full career entitling them to expensive pensions), while fertility 
has gone down leading to a shrinking active population, and thus the tax base is smaller. 
Spending may be driven by demography, but it does not have an answer to a new set of 
corrosive social problems. In most of Europe, the poor are no longer the elderly, but the 
young and the children. 
 
Should we just let things go, and see expenditure be driven by demography and not political 
choices or social justice? Should we do nothing collectively for the younger generation? This 
is a crucial political dilemma for European Social Democratic parties. Those who could 
contribute more to the welfare state (the baby boomers) are more likely to vote. They have the 
feeling that they deserve their social benefits (they indeed worked and paid for it) and do not 
feel selfish since most of them take care of their own children and grandchildren (and 
sometimes also of their frail parents). But should one leave redistribution to be organised 
within families, thus letting rich grandparents help enormously their grandchildren, leaving 
poorer elderly equipped to do very little for their children and grandchildren, hence 
reproducing social inequalities through intergenerational intra-family transfers?  
 
Moreover, behind this question about social justice and redistribution, there is a political 
question. Should the social democrats become the party of the baby boomers, defending only 
those who benefit from the best Social democratic invention so far (the post-war Keynesian 
welfare state), without reaching out to new constituencies, enduring new difficulties on the 
labour market, without being properly represented and taken care of? 
 
The sacrificed groups of current welfare systems 
 
More and more individuals are at a particularly high risk of being in atypical employment 
(short-term contracts, or interim or undesired part-time jobs) or unemployment. This means 
low levels of pay, low levels of social benefits and low levels of employment protection. 
     
Furthermore, some societal groups are over-represented among labour market and social 
protection outsiders in all OECD countries: women, young labour market participants, low-
skilled workers (especially in the service sector), immigrants and workers of migrant origin.  
 
These groups are more likely to be unemployed or atypically employed, and they are more 
likely to be poor and to suffer from insufficient social rights. The available evidence suggests 
that their inferior status is persistent over time. And yet we have increased our spending on 
the elderly, on health, and decreased our spending on the youth (in education) and the 
unskilled (in training).  
 
In order to address these new inequalities, we need to rewrite the social contract between 
generations and invest massively in childhood and youth services. 
 
Does this mean adding to the welfare state burden, next to already existing social 
expenditure? Not so much if those who can contribute do so – not only the very rich but also 
new pensioners, who continue to benefit from fiscal derogations created for their much poorer 
predecessors despite the fact that they are not so poor anymore themselves. 
 
Furthermore, in a longer perspective, it has to be recognised that spending on children and 
young people does not constitute ‘sunk social costs’, but rather qualifies as social investment. 
Here, social justice coincides with economic efficiency. 
 
Indeed, providing all children and young people with much-needed qualifications is also an 
employment policy at a time when qualifications are required to succeed in knowledge-based 
economies. 
 
Under-qualification is a pressing social risk  
 
In today’s economy, qualifications are more important than ever. In this context, the lack of 
adequate qualifications has become a new social risk. Indeed, unemployment rates are much 
higher for the unskilled than they were a couple decades ago, and much higher than for those 
with tertiary education. As the European Commission’s “New skills for new jobs” report 
underlines, the employment rates across Europe as a whole in 2008 for those with high skills 
was 83.9%, that for medium skill levels was 70.6%, but that for low skill levels was only 
48.1%. Not only this, but the wages of the low-skilled have also fallen relative to the more 
skilled despite falling numbers of low-skilled individuals in the labour force, suggesting that 
there has been a fall in the demand for low-skilled labour.  
 
The fact that the unemployed are predominantly unskilled and that vacant jobs require high 
skills shows the importance of the formation, maintenance and updating of skills policies that 
prepare individuals for the current and future economy.  
 
Social investment: Equality and quality  
 
While specific policies are needed to support the least skilled, social investment strategies 
cannot be based exclusively on programmes targeted at “the unskilled” or other disadvantaged 
groups, but should be based in the first place on the provision of universal, quality education 
and training programmes throughout the life-course. Equality and quality must be at the 
centre of the social investment approach in order for the programs to deliver good returns. 
 
At stake here is both equality of access (to childcare, education, life-long training, and 
healthcare services) and income equality. As the Scandinavian countries illustrate, egalitarian 
societies perform better. They are more successful at implementing social investment policies 
and at achieving many of the desired outcomes linked to this strategy.  
 
Gender equality should also be a central goal on the social investment agenda. Raising female 
employment rates cannot be enough. Persistent gender inequalities such as the division of 
unpaid care and household labour, the gender wage gap, labour market segregation and the 
“glass ceiling effect” for women must also be addressed. This means that special attention 
must be paid to the specific design of policies that seek to promote women’s employment and 
to policies for reconciling work and family life. 
 
Early childhood education and care and other services create jobs for women as well as 
allowing mothers of young children to work for pay and to enable families to balance work 
and family life.  Increasing women’s labour force participation obviously responds to 
women’s desire for economic autonomy but it goes beyond that.  It also helps reduce child 
poverty, because poverty is always lower when two parents are employed, and it increases the 
employment rate, such that revenues are higher for states and for insurance-based social 
programs.  
 
Policies “for women” have to do more than simply allow work-family balance; they must also 
provide gender equality and equality of opportunity.  This means, in other words, changing 
men’s trajectories as well as women’s and altering the gender division of labour within the 
household.  
 
“Quality” should be another crucial component of a social investment strategy. This relates 
both to the quality of jobs but also to the quality of services. Only high quality childcare can 
foster good cognitive skill acquisition amongst all children and help reduce social inequalities. 
Participation in a course of education does not directly translate into high achievement: the 
quality of education matters more than simple participation for skill accumulation, 
particularly at the low end of the capability distribution. 
 
The future of social democracy 
 
If European social democrats want to avoid becoming the voting preserve of the now retiring 
beneficiaries of the golden age of social democracy, they need to renew their vision of the 
welfare state towards a more future-oriented social investment strategy that is willing to invest 
in children and youth. Investing in youth means reaching out together to those who are 
currently in most need but who will become the tax base of the future, and may become the 
new electorate of a renewed social democratic political force. 
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